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Abstract
There is a collection of exogenously given socially-feasible sets, and, for each
one of them, each individual in a group chooses from an individually-feasible
set. The fact that the product of the individually-feasible sets is larger than
the socially-feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between in-
dividual choices. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I char-
acterize rationalizable collective choices.
Key words: Revealed preference; random utility; collective choice; con-
sumer choice; individual rationality.
JEL classification numbers: D70, D74, D12.
Suppose that a menu of meal choices, say “beef or chicken,” is offered
to the passengers in an airplane. It seems reasonable to assume that each
passenger makes her own choice based only on what she feels like eating,
without giving any consideration as to whether there will be enough of both
choices to attend the demands of all the passengers in the flight. Quite likely,
if all the passengers chose to order the same meal, there would not be enough
to serve all of them.1 However, it is also likely that in many occasions the
choices of the passengers are such that everyone can be served her own choice.
Three features of this situation are important:
1. a group of individuals face a collective choice problem where the deci-
sion corresponds to a vector of multiple dimensions;
2. each individual chooses some of the dimensions of the vector, consid-
ering only an individual feasibility constraint;
3. the set that is collectively feasible is smaller than the Cartesian product
of the individually-feasible sets.
Indeed, as Debreu (1952, p. 886) has pointed out,
“[i]n a wide class of social systems each agent has a range of
actions among which he selects one. His choice is not, however,
entirely free and the actions of all the other agents determine the
subset to which his selection is restricted. . . and each [agent] tries
by choosing his action in his restricting subset to bring about the
best outcome according to his own preferences.”
In the example, suppose that there are I passengers in the plane who
want to eat. Denote by 0 the decision to order beef and by 1 the decision
to order chicken. Then, for each individual the feasible set is {0, 1} and the
collective choice is a vector x = (xi)
I
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}I . However, if the numbers of
meals available are XC of chicken and XB of beef, then the socially-feasible
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set is just {x ∈ {0, 1}I : I −XB ≤∑i xi ≤ XC}, which may very well be a
proper subset of {0, 1}I .
If one observes a choice situation like this, and the collective choice is
socially feasible, one can argue at least two explanations. The first one is
that sufficiently many members of the group did actually take into account
the collective constraints and were able to accommodate them by their own
choices. An alternative explanation, however, does not require dropping the
assumption of individual rationality: if individual preferences are such that
the profile of individually-rational choices lies within the feasible set, then no
individual needs to consider the collective constraints when making her own
choice.
This paper considers a situation in which there is a family of collectively-
feasible sets (collective budgets), and in which each individual chooses from
their projections into her own choice set. The paper studies the joint dis-
tribution of random preferences that can explain, via individual rationality,
probabilistic distributions of collective choices over collective budgets. It is
motivated by the observation, by Mathematical Psychologists, that a correct
explanation of human choice has to take into account the random nature
of individual preferences. The problem of collective choice, studied in this
setting, stresses the fact that individual preferences need not be independent.
The results are based on McFadden and Richter (1990), where the fi-
nite, individual random choice problem is characterized. As McFadden and
Richter claim, their result is more general than the application they are
explicit about. I consider the more general case of collective choice over not-
necessarily-finite domains, and impose the assumptions that are necessary
to make this case compatible with the condition derived by them. When
this more general setting is considered, however, an unpleasant feature of
the McFadden-Richter solution makes itself evident: their result requires the
analyst to specify the finite family of (profiles of) preferences that will be
allowed to have a positive probability in the rationalization of the observed
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data. Although this may be acceptable when dealing with finite domains,
when one can use the family of all possible orders, it is quite restrictive in
the infinite case, as it narrows the concept of rationality: the fact that a
data set appears at odds with rationality may be due solely to the family of
preferences allowed, and need not mean that there do not exist families of
preferences (and distributions over them) that are able to explain the data
via rationality. I overcome this difficulty by combining standard revealed
preference theory and the McFadden-Richter condition, so as to weaken the
rationalizability requirement to just the existence of a family of preferences
(controlling only its cardinality) and a probability distribution that are able
to exactly explain the data. I also show that, regardless of the cardinal-
ity allowed, there exist data sets which cannot be explained by individual
rationality under random preferences.
1 Stochastic collective choices
Suppose that there is a finite set of decision makers, denoted by I = {1, . . . , I}.
Each decision maker chooses from an individual choice set: individual i
chooses from the nonempty set Xi. The result of individual choices is a
collective choice; the collective choice set is the Cartesian product of all the
individual choice sets, X = ×i∈IXi.
In individual-choice theory, a budget is a nonempty subset of a choice set.
Here, a collective budget is a nonempty subset of the collective choice set,
B ⊆ X.
Suppose that one observes a nonempty family of collective budgets B.2
Endow each budget B ∈ B with a σ-algebra ΣB, and suppose that a proba-
bility measure γB : ΣB → [0, 1] has been observed for each B.
A stochastic collective choice is {I, (Xi)i∈I ,B, (ΣB, γB)B∈B}. All this
information is assumed to be observed data. For a budget B, the σ-algebra
ΣB is determined by how fine the observation of collective choices is; if C ∈
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ΣB, then C is measurable at budget B, and γB(C) is understood as the
observed probability that the collective choice made from budget B lies in
C.
Throughout the paper, I maintain the assumption that the following con-
dition holds:
Assumption 1. B is finite, and for each B ∈ B, ΣB is finite.
2 Strong rationalizability
For any set Z ⊆ X, denote by Zi the projection of Z into Xi.
If one assumes that decision makers act noncooperatively, then for each
budget B and each measurable subset C ∈ ΣB, observed probability γB(C)
is understood as the probability that if each player i chooses xi from her
individually-feasible set, Bi, then the collective choice (xi)i∈I lies in C.
Individuals are assumed to care only about their own decisions, so a
preference relation for individual i is a binary relation over Xi. For each
individual i, let Ri = (Ri,1, Ri,2, . . . , Ri,S) be a finite sequence of preference
relations.
Let R be the set that contains the profiles of preferences conformed by
the individual sequences:
R = {(R1,1, . . . , RI,1), . . . , (R1,S, . . . , RI,S)}.
It is convenient that individually-rational choices be uniquely defined for
all observations in the data, and for all the preferences relations under con-
sideration, so the following condition is assumed in this section:
Assumption 2. For every individual i and every s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, relation
Ri,s is a weak order over Xi such that, for every observed budget B ∈ B,
{x ∈ Bi : xRi,sx′ for all x′ ∈ Bi} is a singleton set.
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Under the previous condition, one can further denote by argmaxBi Ri,s
the (unique) maximizer of preferences Ri,s, when restricted to Bi.
The concept of collective rationality, for a given family of profile prefer-
ences R, can now be stated:
Definition 1. A stochastic collective choice is R-rationalizable if there
exists a probability measure over the set preferences R, that explains the
observed data via individually-rational, noncooperative choices: there exists
δ : P(R)→ [0, 1], a probability measure, such that
δ({R ∈ R : (argmax
Bi
Ri)i∈I ∈ C}) = γB(C),
for every observed budget B ∈ B, and every measurable subset C ∈ ΣB.
Collective rationalizability cannot always be studied by immediate appli-
cation of tools of individual choice theory. To see this, consider the following
example:
Example 1. Suppose that there are two individuals, with choice sets X1 =
X2 = {0, 1}. Suppose that only one collective budget, B = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}, has
been observed (so B = {B}). Let the observed probabilities be γB((0, 1)) =
γB((1, 0)) = 1/2.
If one considers the information available for one individual only, the ob-
servation is that she chooses each available alternative with equal probability,
which can be rationalized by (and only by) assuming that, for her, the two
possible orders over {0, 1} occur with equal probability, 1/2. This individ-
ual analysis, however, does not suffice to explain the collective data: when
collectively choosing from B, the product of individual probabilities would
place probability 1/4 on each of the choices (0, 0) and (1, 1), contradicting
the data.
The following characterization of R-rationalizability is derived from Mc-
Fadden and Richter (1990).3 Define the binary function α : R×⋃B∈B({B}×
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ΣB)→ {0, 1} as follows:
α(R,B,C) =
{
1, if (argmaxBi Ri)i∈I ∈ C;
0, otherwise.
Theorem 1. A stochastic collective choice is R-rationalizable if, and only
if, for every finite sequence of pairs of (observed) budgets and associated
measurable subsets, (Bk, Ck)
K
k=1 such that Ck ∈ ΣBk for all k, there exists a
postulated profile of preferences, R ∈ R, such that
K∑
k=1
γBk(Ck) ≤
K∑
k=1
α(R,Bk, Ck).
Proof. Define the ternary relation Γ on the set R×B×⋃B∈B ΣB as follows:
say that Γ(R,B,C) if, and only if, C ∈ ΣB and (argmaxBi Ri)i∈I ∈ C. By
construction, Γ(R,B,C) implies C ∈ ΣB and ¬Γ(R,B,B \ C). Also, the
collective choice is R-rationalizable if, and only if, there exists a probability
measure δ : P(R)→ [0, 1] such that γB(C) = δ({R ∈ R : Γ(R,B,C)}) for all
B ∈ B and all C ∈ ΣB. And, by construction, α(R,B,C) = 1 if, and only if,
Γ(R,B,C). Although the choice sets Xi need not be finite, since B is finite
and each ΣB is finite, it then follows from McFadden and Richter (1990),
theorem 2 and footnote 30, that the collective choice is R-rationalizable if,
and only if, for every finite sequence (Bk, Ck)
K
k=1 in
⋃
B∈B({B} × ΣB), it is
true that
∑K
k=1 γBk(Ck) ≤ maxR∈R
∑K
k=1 α(R,Bk, Ck).
The condition of this theorem is what McFadden and Richter have called
the “Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference.” Its intuition is that events
that are likely to happen should happen often. That is, consider the sit-
uation ‘for each k, if each individual chooses from Bi,k, then, collectively,
they choose an element of Ck,’ and suppose that such situation is ‘highly
likely,’ in the sense that the left-hand side of the condition of the theorem,∑
k γBk(Ck) is ‘high;’ then, it should also be true that for at least one of
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the preferences profiles, it happens that from ‘many’ of the budgets Bk, the
group would choose an element of Ck, which would make the right-hand side
of the condition ‘high’ as well.
For the case of individual choice problems over not-necessarily-finite choice
sets, Clark (1996) has shown that rationalizability is equivalent to DeFinetti’s
Coherence Axiom of Probability, and that this axiom is equivalent to the
Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference. In the finite case, an alterna-
tive characterization of rationalizability at the individual level was given by
Falmagne (1978), and refined by Barbera´ and Pattanaik (1996). McFadden
(2005) formalizes the equivalence between the latter condition and the Axiom
of Revealed Stochastic Preference.
3 Weak rationalizability
The previous section assumed that a finite family of individual preference
relations, and the way in which they form profiles of preferences, were given.
Suppose now that one only knows a nonempty, finite set of states of the
world, Ω, and that for each i ∈ I, one only fixes a class Ri of binary relations
over Xi. Here, I consider only the families defined by the following condition:
Assumption 3. For every i ∈ I, Ri is the family of all weak orders, Ri,
over the choice set Xi, such that for each observed budget B ∈ B, {x ∈ Bi :
xRix
′ for all x′ ∈ Bi} is a singleton set.
Weak rationalizability is obtained if one can assign to each state of the
world a profile of preferences and a probability which are able to explain the
observed probabilities via pure individual rationality:
Definition 2. A stochastic collective choice is Ω-rationalizable if there
exist a probability measure over the set of states of the world, and an assign-
ment of preferences to states of the world that explain the observed data via
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individually-rationality: there exist δ : P(Ω) → [0, 1], a probability measure,
and R : Ω→ ×i∈IRi such that
δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
Bi
Ri(ω))i∈I ∈ C}) = γB(C),
for every observed budget B ∈ B and every measurable subset C ∈ ΣB.
The following theorem is the characterization, analogous to theorem 1,
for this weaker definition of rationalizability. For every set Z ⊆ X, let
1Z : X → {0, 1} denote its indicator function.
Theorem 2. A stochastic collective choice is Ω-rationalizable if, and only
if, there exist individually-feasible choices, xi,B,ω ∈ Bi, for every individual
i ∈ I, every budget B ∈ B and every state of nature ω ∈ Ω, such that for
every finite sequence of pairs of observed budgets and associated measurable
subsets, (Bk, Ck)
K
k=1 such that Ck ∈ ΣBk for all k, it is true that:
1. For every individual and every state, the Congruence Axiom is satisfied:
for every i ∈ I and every ω ∈ Ω, if xi,Bk+1,ω ∈ Bi,k for every k ≤ K−1,
then either xi,BK ,ω = xi,B1,ω or xi,B1,ω /∈ Bi,K.
2. There exists some state of the world ω ∈ Ω such that
K∑
k=1
γBk(Ck) ≤
K∑
k=1
1Ck((xi,Bk,ω)i∈I).
Proof. Suppose that a choice is Ω-rationalized by the probability measure
δ : P(Ω) → [0, 1] and the function R : Ω → ×i∈IRi. Define, for each i,
each B and each ω, xi,B,ω = argmaxBi Ri(ω). By construction, xi,B,ω ∈ Bi.
Since the (deterministic) individual choice (xi,B,ω, Bi)B∈B is regular-rational,
it follows from Richter (1966), theorem 1, that it must satisfy condition 1 of
the theorem. Moreover, let R = R(Ω) and define δ˜ = P(R) → [0, 1];Q 7→
δ(R−1(Q)). Function δ˜ is a probability measure over R, and satisfies that
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δ˜({R ∈ R : (argmaxBi Ri)i∈I ∈ C}) = γB(C), for all B ∈ B and all C ∈ ΣB.
The latter means that function δ˜ R-rationalizes the collective choice. Since,
by construction, R is finite, it follows from theorem 1 that for every finite
sequence (Bk, Ck)
K
k=1 defined in
⋃
B∈B({B} × ΣB), there exists some R˜ ∈ R
such that
K∑
k=1
γBk(Ck) ≤
K∑
k=1
α(R˜, Bk, Ck).
Let ω ∈ R−1(R˜) and notice that α(R(ω), B, C) = 1 is true if, and only if,
1C((xi,B,ω)i∈I) = 1, which proves condition 2.
For sufficiency, first fix an individual, i, and a state of the world, ω. Since
(xi,B,ω, Bi)B∈B satisfies the condition 1 of the theorem, it follows from Richter
(1966), theorem 1, that there exists Ri,ω ∈ Ri such that for all B ∈ B, it
is true that argmaxBi R
i,ω = xi,B,ω. Now, define R = {(Ri,ω)i∈I : ω ∈ Ω}.
Take a finite sequence (Bk, Ck)
K
k=1 defined in
⋃
B∈B({B}×ΣB). By condition
2, there exists a state ω ∈ Ω such that
K∑
k=1
γBk(Ck) ≤
K∑
k=1
1Ck((xi,Bk,ω)i∈I) =
K∑
k=1
α((Ri,ω)i∈I , Bk, Ck).
Since R is finite, the latter implies, by theorem 1, that there exists a prob-
ability measure δ˜ : P(R) → [0, 1] that R-rationalizes the collective choice.
Define the functions R : Ω → ×i∈IRi;ω 7→ (Ri,ω)i∈I , and δ : P(Ω) →
[0, 1]; Φ 7→ δ˜({(Ri,ω)i∈I ∈ R : ω ∈ Φ}). Function δ is a probability measure
over Ω. Also, for any B ∈ B and any C ∈ ΣB,
δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
Bi
Ri(ω))i∈I ∈ C}) = δ˜({R ∈ R : (argmax
Bi
Ri)i∈I ∈ C})
= γB(C),
so functions δ and R Ω-rationalize the collective choice.
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4 Nonrationalizable data sets
The previous subsections characterize stochastic, collective rationalizability.
I now show examples of collective choices that are not weakly (and therefore
not strongly) rationalizable.
4.1 Regularity
Consider the following data:
Example 2. There are two individuals, I = {1, 2}. Suppose that their choice
sets are X1 = X2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and let there be two observed collective bud-
gets, B = {Bˆ, B˜}, where Bˆ = {1, 2}×X2 and B˜ = {1, 2, 3, 4}×X2. Suppose
that the measurable subsets include {(1, 1), (1, 2)} ∈ ΣBˆ, {(1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5)} ∈
ΣBˆ, {1} ×X2 ∈ ΣB˜, and the observed probabilities are γBˆ({(1, 1), (1, 2)}) =
1/6, γBˆ({(1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5)}) = 1/6, and γB˜({1} ×X2) = 1/2.
These data are not Ω-rationalizable, for any Ω, since rationalizability
would require functions δ and R such that
1/3 = γBˆ({(1, 1), (1, 2)}) + γBˆ({(1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5)})
= δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
Bˆi
Ri(ω))i∈I ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2)}})
+δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
Bˆi
Ri(ω))i∈I ∈ {(1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5)}})
= δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
Bˆi
Ri(ω))i∈I ∈ {1} ×X2})
= δ({ω ∈ Ω : argmax
{1,2}
R1(ω) = 1})
≥ δ({ω ∈ Ω : arg max
{1,2,3,4}
R1(ω) = 1})
= δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
B˜i
Ri(ω))i∈I ∈ {1} ×X2})
= γB˜({1} ×X2)
= 1/2.
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Indeed, the way in which the collective budgets is given here implies that
the restrictions of individual stochastic choice theory apply, and the example
violates the Regularity Principle of Block and Marshak (1960).
4.2 Co-variation
By its construction, the previous example did not exploit any co-variation in
individual preferences. Consider now the following data:
Example 3. There are two individuals, I = {1, 2}. Suppose that the choice
sets are X1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and X2 = [1, 5], and let there be two collective
budgets, so B = {Bˆ, B˜}, where
Bˆ = ({1} × [1, 5]) ∪ ({2} × [1, 4]) ∪ ({3} × [1, 3]) ∪ ({4} × [1, 2]) ∪ {(5, 1)}
B˜ = {(1, 5)} ∪ ({2} × [4, 5]) ∪ ({3} × [3, 5]) ∪ ({4} × [2, 5]) ∪ ({5} × [1, 5]).
Define Cˆ = ({1} × [4, 5]) ∪ {(2, 4)} and C˜ = X1 × {5}, and suppose that
these sets are measurable: Cˆ ∈ ΣBˆ and C˜ ∈ ΣB˜. Finally, suppose that the
observed probabilities are γBˆ(Cˆ) = 1/3 and γB˜(C˜) = 1/2.
Since Bˆ1 = B˜1 = X
1 and Bˆ2 = B˜2 = X2, if functions δ and R Ω-
rationalize the data for some Ω, then, for every observed budget, B, and
every state of the world with positive probability, ω ∈ Ω such that δ(ω) > 0,
it must be true that
argmax
B1
R1(ω) + argmax
B2
R2(ω) = 6.
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But this implies that
1/3 = γBˆ(Cˆ)
= δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
Xi
Ri(ω))i∈I ∈ {(2, 4), (1, 5)}})
≥ δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
Xi
Ri(ω))i∈I = (1, 5)})
= γB˜(C˜)
= 1/2.
This shows that these data are not weakly rationalizable and, therefore,
cannot be strongly rationalized. This example illustrates the need for co-
variation in the joint distribution of individual preferences, which was also
observed in example 1. Example 1, however, was collectively rationalizable,
while example 3 is not individually rationalizable. An example of data that
are individually rationalizable, but not collectively rationalizable is given
next:
Example 4. As before, there are two individuals, I = {1, 2}. Their choice
sets are X1 = X2 = {0, 1, 2}, and two collective budgets are observed,
Bˆ = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 0)},
and
B˜ = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (0, 2)},
so B = {Bˆ, B˜}. There is perfect measurability, and observed probabilities are
γBˆ({x}) = 1/6 for all x ∈ Bˆ, and γB˜({x}) = 1/6 for all x ∈ B˜.
These individual choices can be Ω-rationalized for any Ω with at least
three states of nature. To see this, suppose that one wants to explain the
behavior of individual i only. Since Bˆi = B˜i = Xi, one only needs to con-
centrate on the (common) marginal distribution of observed choices over the
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whole choice set:
γi({0}) = γi({1}) = γi({2}) = 1/3.
Let Ωi = {1, 2, 3}, let δi be the uniform probability measure over Ωi, and
define the following (individual) strict preference assignment: Ri(1) orders
Xi as 0  1  2, Ri(2) as 1  2  0, and Ri(3) as 2  0  1. Then, for
every x ∈ Xi,
δi({ω ∈ Ωi : argmax
Xi
Ri(ω) = x}) = 1
3
= γi({x}).
Collective Ω-rationalizability, however, is impossible regardless of Ω, for if
functions δ and R Ω-rationalize the data for some Ω, then
1/6 = γBˆ({(0, 1)})
= δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
Bˆi
Ri(ω))
2
i=1 = (0, 1)}
= δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
Xi
Ri(ω))
2
i=1 = (0, 1)}
= δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
B˜i
Ri(ω))
2
i=1 = (0, 1)}
≤ δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
B˜i
Ri(ω))
2
i=1 /∈ Bˆ}
= 1− δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax
B˜i
Ri(ω))
2
i=1 ∈ Bˆ}
= 1− γB˜(B˜)
= 0.
4.3 Consumers
In economics, a prominent decision problem is the choice of consumption
bundles, at exogenous prices, under a budget constraint. For the individual
demand problem under random preferences, Bandyopadhyay et Al. (1999)
extend the weak axiom of revealed preference. Earlier, Hildenbrand (1971)
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derived properties on the expected demand of an individual consumer with
random preferences, and, for collective problems, obtained asymptotic prop-
erties as the number of consumers increases, under independence assump-
tions. Here, I apply the results above to the case of consumers, and illustrate
the importance of preference co-variation.
Suppose that there are a finite number, L, of consumption goods, so
Xi = RL+ for each individual i. Prices, p, are vectors of L positive numbers,
one price for each commodity. Individual i is endowed with a bundle of
commodities, ei, which, for simplicity, is assumed to contain positive amounts
of all commodities. Individual preferences are restricted to Ri = R, the
class of all relations representable by continuous, strictly monotone, strongly
quasiconcave utility functions.
There is finite a set of data, D ⊆ RL++ × (RL++)I , of prices, p, and pro-
files of individual endowments of commodities, e = (ei)i∈I . Individuals face
constraints in the usual form of individual budgets: given (p, e) ∈ D, each in-
dividual i chooses from the standard budget B(p, ei) = {x ∈ RL+ : p·x ≤ p·ei}.
Social feasibility, however, must take into account the aggregate endowment
of commodities: given (p, e), the collective constraint is
B(p, e) =
{
(xi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈IB(p, ei) :
∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i∈I
ei
}
.
For each (p, e) ∈ D, B(p, e) is endowed with a finite σ-algebra, Σp,e, and
a probability measure γp,e : Σp,e → [0, 1] is assumed to have been observed.
Suppose that Σp,e = Σp′,e′ and γp,e = γp′,e′ , whenever B(p, e) = B(p
′, e′).
A stochastic collective demand is {I, D, (Σp,e, γp,e)(p,e)∈D}. It is Ω-
rationalizable if there exist a probability measure δ over Ω, and an assignment
of preferences to states of the world, R, that explain the observed data via
individually-rationality: for every observed collective budget (p, e) ∈ D, and
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every measurable subset C ∈ Σp,e,
δ({ω ∈ Ω : (arg max
B(p,ei)
Ri(ω))i∈I ∈ C}) = γp,e(C).
Since, in this case, individual budgets may be larger than the projection
of the collective budgets, theorem 2 does not apply immediately.
Theorem 3. A stochastic collective demand is Ω-rationalizable if, and only
if, there exist individual state-contingent demands, xi,(p,e),ω, and real numbers
λi,(p,e),ω > 0 and Vi,(p,e),ω, for each individual i, each observation (p, e) ∈ D,
and each state ω ∈ Ω, such that:
1. For every state of the world, aggregate feasibility is observed: for all
(p, e) ∈ D and all ω ∈ Ω, it is true that ∑i∈I xi,(p,e),ω =∑i∈I ei.
2. For each individual and each state of the world, Walras’s law and Afriat
inequalities are satisfied: for all i ∈ I and all ω ∈ Ω, it is true that, for
all (p, e), (p′, e′) ∈ D, p · xi,(p,e),ω = p · ei and
Vi,(p′,e′),ω ≥ Vi,(p,e),ω + λi,(p,e),ωp · (xi,(p′,e′),ω − xi,(p,e),ω),
with strict inequality if xi,(p,e),ω 6= xi,(p′,e′),ω.
3. For every finite sequence of observed data and measurable sets, ((pk, ek), Ck)
K
k=1
such that Ck ∈ Σpk,ek at all k, there exists a state of the world ω ∈ Ω
such that
K∑
k=1
γpk,ek(Ck) ≤
K∑
k=1
1Ck((xi,(pk,ek),ω)i∈I).
Proof. The argument is similar to the one given for theorem 2, invoking
Matzkin and Richter (1991), theorem 2, instead of Richter (1966).
Now, consider the following data:
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Example 5. There are two consumers, I = {1, 2}, and two commodi-
ties, L = 2. There are two observations of prices and endowments: D =
{(p˜, e˜), (pˆ, eˆ)}, where p˜ = (1, 2), e˜1 = (1, 2), e˜2 = (5/3, 2/3), pˆ = (2, 1),
eˆ1 = (2, 1), and eˆ2 = (2/3, 5/3). Define the set Cˆ as
{(x1, x2) ∈ R4+ : x1,1+2x1,2 ∈ [4.5, 5.5], 2x1,1+x1,2 = 5, and x1+x2 = (8/3, 8/3))}
and let C˜ = {((5/3, 5/3), (1, 1))}.4 Suppose further that these sets are mea-
surable, so that Cˆ ∈ Σpˆ,eˆ and C˜ ∈ Σp˜,e˜,5 and assume that the observed
probabilities are γpˆ,eˆ(Cˆ) = 1/3 and γp˜,e˜(C˜) = 1/2.
Suppose that for some set Ω of states of nature, the data is Ω-rationalized
by the probability measure δ over Ω, and the preference assignment function
R, which maps into R2. Fix any state ω¯ with positive probability, and such
that
(arg max
B(p˜,e˜i)
Ri(ω¯))
2
i=1 ∈ C˜,
and denote x˜i = argmaxB(p˜,e˜i)Ri(ω¯) and xˆi = argmaxB(pˆ,eˆi)Ri(ω¯), for each
i. Since each Ri(ω¯) ∈ R, it follows from the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preferences that xˆi,2 ≥ x˜i,2 for both individuals. But since x˜1,2 + x˜2,2 =
8/3 = eˆ1,2 + eˆ2,2, it follows that xˆi,2 = x˜i,2, and then, by Walras’s law, that
xˆi = x˜i for both individuals. Then,
(xˆi)
2
i=1 = (arg max
B(pˆ,eˆi)
Ri(ω¯))
2
i=1 ∈ Cˆ.
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The latter implies that
1/2 = γp˜,e˜(C˜)
= δ({ω ∈ Ω : (arg max
B(p˜,e˜i)
Ri(ω))
2
i=1 ∈ C˜})
≤ δ({ω ∈ Ω : (arg max
B(pˆ,eˆi)
Ri(ω))
2
i=1 ∈ Cˆ})
= γpˆ,eˆ(Cˆ)
= 1/3,
an obvious contradiction.
5 Concluding remarks:
This paper studied situations in which individuals choose from their own
choice sets, subject only to their own constraints, and no conflict arises in
spite of the fact that the set of socially feasible choices may be smaller than
the product of the individually feasible sets. For this to occur, individual
preferences cannot be distributed across individuals in an arbitrary man-
ner. The problem is simple when only one collective choice situation is faced
or when individual preferences are assumed to be invariant. A more inter-
esting situation arises when there is a sequence of exogenously given social
constraints and individual preferences are allowed to change randomly. In
this case, if one has observed probabilistic distributions of collective choices
over the socially feasible sets, one can only maintain the hypothesis of indi-
vidual rationality under the assumption that preferences, however random,
are not independent across individuals. The alternative would be to assume
that some individuals take into account social feasibility, which amounts to
dropping the usual assumption of individual rationality.
Collective choices are characterized in terms of the way in which indi-
vidual preferences must co-vary in order to explain observed distributions
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of choices via individual rationality. Two definitions of rationalizability were
considered. The first one assumed that one is given the profiles of preferences
that are allowed in the rationalization, and the problem reduces to assigning
probabilities to those profiles. The main result here is that a condition defined
by McFadden and Richter (1990), called the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic
Preferences, characterizes rationalizability. This definition, however, appears
to be too strong in the sense that lack of rationalizability may be due to the
set of profiles of preferences and not to the observed stochastic choice. This
leads to the second, weaker definition of rationalizability, in which one is
given a set of states of the world, and the problem requires assigning to each
one of them a profile of preferences, within certain classes, and a probability.
Rationalizability in this case is characterized by a combination of the Axiom
of Stochastic Revealed Preferences and several instances of the Congruence
Axiom (or the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences) – as many as there
are states of the world. It is finally shown that there exist collective choices
that cannot be rationalized in either sense.
In terms of the introductory example, consider the case of an airline that
wants to test the hypothesis that its passengers on some particular route
are systematically rationed in their meal choices. Suppose that the airline
offers any two of a finite set of meal alternatives, and suppose, for simplicity,
that the number of passengers on this route is always the same I, and all of
them always eat.6 Suppose that, over a long number of flights, the airline
has estimated the probabilities of different feasible meal allocations, for ev-
ery possible combination of alternatives.7 Fix a set of demographic profiles
of passengers for this flight. The airline wants to test whether there exist
a probabilistic distribution over demographic profiles and an assignment of
preferences to demographic profiles such that all the observed distributions
of meal servings are explained by the theoretical probabilities.8 Theorem 2
provides a (strongest) test for this hypothesis: the hypothesis is not rejected
if, and only if, one can define a feasible allocation for every possible menu
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and every demographic profile, such that: (i) for every seat on the airplane,
and for every demographic profile, the postulated choice is rationalizable
using standard revealed preference arguments across menus; and (ii) along
any finite sequence of menus and feasible allocations, observed probabilities
should accumulate no more rapidly than the number of times that the allo-
cation given by the sequence coincides with the postulated allocation, for at
least one demographic profile.9
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Notes
1In fact, the in-flight menu of Cathay Pacific for June 2006 states that they “apologize
if, due to previous passenger selection, [the choice of a passenger] is not available.”
2For any set Z, denote by P(Z) its power set. Then, B ⊆ P(X) \ {∅}.
3If, for all observed budgets B ∈ B, it is true that B = ×i∈IBi, and if all the binary
relations Ri,s are representable, then theorem 1 follows directly from Theorem 2 in Mc-
Fadden and Richter (1990), since maximizing individual relations over individual domains
is then equivalent to maximizing their sum over the Cartesian product of those domains.
4In the case of two subindexes, the first denotes the consumer and the second the
commodity.
5By construction, Cˆ ⊆ B(pˆ, eˆ) and C˜ ⊆ B(p˜, e˜).
6I am not assuming that it is always the same people in the flight, as will be clear below.
Suppose that the number of passengers is I, and denote by X the set of meal alternatives
used by the airline. Suppose that for any (x˜, xˆ) ∈ X 2, x˜ 6= xˆ, the airline prepares Kx˜,xˆ(x˜)
servings of meal x˜, and Kx˜,xˆ(xˆ) of meal xˆ, satisfying that Kx˜,xˆ(x˜) + Kx˜,xˆ(xˆ) ≥ I. For
consistency, Kx˜,xˆ(xˆ) = Kxˆ,x˜(x˜).
7For each (x˜, xˆ) ∈ X 2, and for each x ∈ {x˜, xˆ}I such that ‖{i ∈ I : xi = x˜}‖ ≤ Kx˜,xˆ(x˜)
and ‖{i ∈ I : xi = xˆ}‖ ≤ Kx˜,xˆ(xˆ), the observed probability of allocation x of meals is
γx˜,xˆ(x), when the menu (x˜, xˆ) is available.
8Enumerate the seats on the airplane 1, . . . , I. Let Ω be a set of demographic profiles
of passengers for this flight. Let R be the set of orders over X . The hypothesis is that
there exist functions δ : P(Ω)→ [0, 1] and R : Ω→ RI such that, for all pairs of meals x˜
and xˆ, δ({ω ∈ Ω : (argmax{x˜,xˆ}Ri(ω))i∈I = x}) = γx˜,xˆ(x).
9There must exist x(x˜,xˆ),ω ∈ {x˜, xˆ}I , feasible, for every menu (x˜, xˆ) and every demo-
graphic profile ω, such that for every finite sequence (x˜k, xˆk, xk)Kk=1, such that xk and is
feasible for menu (x˜, xˆ), one has that: (i) for every seat i and every demographic profile
ω, if xi,(x˜k,xˆk),ω ∈ {x˜k−1, xˆk−1} for every k ≤ K − 1, then either xi,(x˜K ,xˆK),ω = xi,(x˜1,xˆ1),ω
or xi,(x˜1,xˆ1),ω /∈ {x˜K , xˆK}; and (ii) there exists some demographic profile ω such that∑K
k=1 γ(x˜k,xˆk)(xk) ≤
∑K
k=1 1{xk}((x(x˜k,xˆk)},ω).
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